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The Court of justice of the European Communities possesses  several  'birth certificates'. 
When they created the first European Community,  the  authors of the Treaty of Paris 
(April1951) determined the identity of  the institutions which were to govern the European 
Coal and Steel Community.  Article 7 of the ECSC Treaty establishes the institutions 
of the Coal and Steel Community:  a High Authority, a Common Assembly,  a  Special 
Council of Ministers and a Court of  justice. 
Recognizing that a new legal  order was being created,  but without perhaps at that time 
envisaging its future development and impetus, the authors of the Treaty clearly under-
stood  the  necessity  of creat1:ng  an  institution  having the  task of reviewing the  legality 
of  acts of  the Community authorities, of  maintaining a balance in their relations with the 
Member  States  and  respect  for  their  own  powers  and  of developing  a  coherent  and 
uniform interpretation of the provisions of Community law. 
The Treaties of Rome which, in 1957, established the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) or Euratom), adopted 
the same  institutional scheme as  that of the Treaty of Paris (the High Authority being 
subsequently designated as 'the Commission'). 
The Court of  Justice is therefore very much a Community institution. 
The Convention on certain Institutions common to the European Communities of  25 March 
1957 laid down at Article 3 that the jurisdiction which each of the three Treaties confers 
upon the Court of  justice should be exercised by a single court. 
3 Characteristics 
of  the Court of  Justice 
ECSC Treaty,  Art. 31 
EEC Treaty,  Art. 164 
EAEC Treaty,  Art. 136 
It is  the task of the Court of Justice to ensure that in the 
interpretation  and  application  of  the  Treaties  and  im-
plementing regulations issued by the Council or the Com-
mission the law is observed.  A  wide-ranging jurisdiction indeed, but a specialized 
one since the powers of the European Court are limited to Community law alone. 
AN  INTERNATIONAL  COURT 
The Treaties establishing the European Communities are instruments of  internation-
allaw. 
By its very nature the Court forms part of the international legal system and indeed 
in one of  its first important judgments of  principle (Van Gend en Loos-Case 26-62) 
it stated that : 'The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law'. 
Since disputes between States are matters for international courts, the Treaty gives 
the Court of Justice jurisdiction to rule in cases concerning  failures  by Member 
States to fulfil their obligations (see page 11). 
However,  the international nature of this  procedure is  somewhat limited by the 
fact that not only the Member States may bring such actions, - which is standard 
practice - but that they are also open to the Commission. 
Although  this  intervention  by  the  Commission  may  seem  unorthodox  by  the 
standards  of ordinary  international  law,  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  this  power 
avoids the engendering of political tension between Member States, which would be 
the consequence of any dispute arising directly between them. 
A  CONSTITUTIONAL  COURT 
The Court of Justice of the European Communities is  by no means the Supreme 
Court of a Federal State.  It is  however acting at the constitutional level when it 
5 gives  rulings  regarding the respective  rights  and duties of the institutions of the 
Community as  between each other and when it reaches  decisions  regarding the 
institutional balance to be maintained between the States and the Community. 
In its mode of interpretation the Court also  frequently refers to the fundamental 
objectives  of the  Treaties,  in which  connexion  one  may speak of 'an economic 
constitution'. 
AN  ADMINISTRATIVE  COURT 
Proceedings before the Community Court are to a  considerable extent concerned 
with administrative matters.  Special mention must be made of the procedure for 
establishing legality, which is closely allied to French administrative law and tends 
to equate the Court of  Justice with a Supreme Court ensuring legality in the applica-
tion and interpretation of common rules. 
In this field,  the Community legal  order departs from general international legal 
practice, in which virtually all measures are taken by the States. 
In fact,  three treaties ensure the protection of individuals (natural or legal persons) 
against acts of the Community administration.  There are many courses of action 
open to them : the action for annulment, the action for failure to act, the objection 
of illegality and the procedure for preliminary rulings, the latter necessarily involving 
the intervention of a national court (see infra, pages 11  to 15). 
It should be noted that the Treaties of Rome (EEC and Euratom) imposed certain 
limitations on the provisions of the Treaty of Paris (ECSC) regarding the admissibil-
ity  of actions  for  annulment  brought  by  individuals.  According  to  the  ECSC 
Treaty, undertakings or associations may bring actions against individual decisions 
or recommendations concerning them or which they consider to involve a misuse of 
powers affecting them, whereas the EEC and Euratom Treaties allow  individuals 
to bring such an action for annulment only against decisions addressed  to  them or 
against those which,  although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed 
to another person, are of direct and individual concern  to  them. 
It was the intention of the authors of the Treaties of Rome that true legislative mea-
sures should not be subject to control through the procedure for the review of legality. 
Another aspect of administrative procedure is  the Court's jurisdiction in actions 
brought by officials  of the European Civil Service.  In fact  the Court bears sole 
responsibility for the defence of the rights of the individual against illegal action on 
the part of the administration,  that is  to say,  it has the task of settling disputes 
between officials and other servants of the Communities on the one hand and the 
institutions,  the  Communities  or  even  the  Member  States  on the  other.  Such 
disputes are generally decided by the Chambers of the Court.  In order to reduce 
the volume of work which such staff cases represent for the Court, the procedure is 
soon to be modified so that a court of first instance will be entrusted with the task 
of examining the dispute at a factual  level  so  that the Court will merely have to 
deliver judgment on the law. 
6 The  Court  also  discharges  the  important  task  of interpreting  Community law. 
This interpretative role  is supremely necessary in view of the incomplete state of 
integration achieved  by the European Treaties.  The Member States incorporate 
the Community legal  order into their own legal  systems and are subject thereto, 
the national courts are invited to apply Community law as an integral part of their 
own law and numerous provisions are directly applicable.  It is therefore indispen-
sable that a single institution should give a uniform interpretation of this new law. 
It is by the expedient of preliminary questions (see infra,  page 13)  that the Court 
discharges this task. 
CIVIL  JURISDICTION 
The Court of Justice  has  a  power  of unlimited jurisdiction to  declare  that the 
Community  has  incurred  non-contractual  liability.  The  Community  may  be 
ordered to make good any damage, whether caused by material acts or by legislative 
measures. 
7 Composition and organization 
of  the Court of  Justice 
Judges and Advocates-General.  The  Court of Justice 
is composed of nine Judges.  It  is assisted by four Advocates-
General.  These numbers were fixed after the accession of 
the new Member States. 
ECSC  Treaty,  Articles 
31,  32,  32a and 32b 
EEC  Treaty,  Articles 
165, 166 and  167 
EAEC  Treaty,  Articles 
137,  138 and  139 
The Members of the Court are chosen from persons whose 
independence  is  beyond  doubt  and  who  possess  the  qualifications  required  for 
appointment to the highest judicial office  in their respective countries or who are 
jurisconsults of recognized competence. 
Judges and Advocates-General are  appointed by common accord of the Govern-
ments of the Member States for a term of six years.  The appointments are renew-
able  and every  three years  there is  a  partial  replacement  of Members,  affecting 
five  and four Judges  alternately  and two  Advocates-General.  The Judges  elect 
a President of the Court of Justice from among their number for a term of three 
years;  he may be re-elected.  The Court designates  the Presidents of Chambers 
and a first Advocate-General for a period of one year. 
It is  the  duty  of the  Advocate-General,  acting  with  complete  impartiality  and 
independence, to deliver, in open court, a reasoned opinion on cases brought before 
the Court of Justice,  in order to assist the Court in the performance of the task 
assigned to it.  The orgin of this post may be traced to the 'Commissaire du Gou-
vernement'  before  the  French  Conseil  d'Etat.  The  opinion  of  the  Advocate-
General contains a full analysis of both facts and law, a study of the relevant legal 
doctrine  and case-law  and,  often,  a  comparative  study of various  national  laws. 
It suggests to the Court the legal sol uti  on to the dispute and is therefore a useful 
summing-up of the case. 
The  way in  which the Advocate-General thus prepares the ground and offers a solution 
may also be compared to the activities of the amicus curiae in English law. The Advo-
cate-General, who represents the 'common interest', acts entirely on his own initiative. 
8 The particular functions  entrusted to the President of the Court are enumerated 
in the Rules of Procedure, the latest version of which was approved by the Council 
of the European Communities on 26 November 1974. 
Articles 8  & 9(2) of the 
Rules  of Procedure 
The President directs the judicial business and the admini-
stration of the Court; he presides at hearings and at delib-
erations in the deliberation Room.  He assigns  cases  to one of the Chambers (the 
Court is composed of two Chambers, each directed by a President of Chamber) for 
the purposes of any measures of inquiry and designates from that Chamber a Judge 
to act as Rapporteur and the Advocate-General. 
ECSC Treaty,  Art. 32c 
EEC Treaty,  Art. 168 
EAEC Treaty,  Art. 140 
Registrar.  The Court of Justice appoints its Registrar and 
lays down the rules governing his service.  He is appointed 
for six years and his term of office is renewable. 
The Registrar fulfils a dual role : 
- he is  responsible for the Registry,  involving the registration,  transmission and 
custody of all procedural documents; 
- he directs the administration, inasmuch as he is responsible for the management 
of the Court as regards finance,  administration and accounts. 
9 Jurisdiction 
1 
of  the Court of  Justice 
ECSC Treaty,  Art. 31 
EEC Treaty,  Art. 164 
EAEC Treaty,  Art. 136 
'The  Court  shall  ensure  that  in  the  interpretation  and 
application of this Treaty ... the law is observed'. 
These few words, which are identical in the three Treaties, 
outline the general task of the Court.  That task is  strictly  limited to the inter-
pretation  and  application  of Community  legal  rules.  It has  no  jurisdiction  to 
interpret or, a fortiori, to review the validity of rules of national law.  However, the 
Court's task cannot be confined strictly to the wording of  the Treaties and to second-
ary Community law, that is to say measures adopted by the institutions, but extends 
to general principles of Community law and to the fundamental individual rights 
enshrined therein. 
The Court is sovereign and its judgments may not be referred to any higher court. 
Finally, the Court of Justice, like the other institutions of the Community, can act 
only within the limits of  the powers conferred upon it by the Treaties and subsequent 
agreements (second subparagraph of Article 4(1)  of the EEC Treaty). 
METHODS  OF  RECOURSE. 
The various  legal  remedies  may  be  classified  into  two  broad  categories :  direct 
actions and requests for preliminary rulings. 
I - Direct Actions 
These actions are pursued by means of adversary proceedings involving written and 
oral  stages. 
1  This outline of the jurisdiction of the Court is undertaken with special reference to the EEC Treaty, 
since the ECSC and Euratom Treaties embody similar machinery. 
10 ECSC  Treaty,  Articles 
88 and 89 
EAEC  Treaty,  Articles 
141  to 143 
EEC  Treaty,  Articles 
169 to 171 
Action for  failure  to  fulfill  an  obligation.  The  Court has 
jurisdiction  to  give  rulings  on  actions  brought  against 
Member  States  which  have  failed  to  fulfil  an  obligation 
under the Treaties. 
Mention must be  made  of the important  role  played  by 
the Commission in initiating and pursuing this procedure.  In fact, if the Commis-
sion considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty 
or an implementing regulation, it submits to the Member State concerned a reasoned 
opinion requiring it to comply with the obligation in question.  If, after a specified 
period,  the Member State  concerned  does  not  adopt  the  measures  necessary  to 
comply with its Community obligations, the Commission refers the matter to the 
Court of Justice.  This course of action is also open to the States themselves in the 
event of their considering that one of their partners has  failed  to fulfil  such an 
obligation.  However, before taking the matter to the Court of  Justice, the applicant 
State must refer the matter to the Commission which, if it judges this to be necessary, 
delivers a reasoned opinion.  This direct procedure, whereby a Member State can 
bring a direct action against another Member State,  has  never,  in all  the twenty 
years  and  more  of the  Court's  existence,  been  employed,  perhaps  because,  for 
readily understandable reasons of diplomacy and courtesy, the States prefer to leave 
to the Commission the responsibility of bringing proceedings before the Court. 
If  the Court finds that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the 
Treaty,  the State is  required to  take  the necessary  measures to comply with the 
judgment of the Court. 
ECSC  Treaty,  Articles 
33 to 35 
EAEC  Treaty,  Articles 
146 to 148 
EEC  Treaty,  Articles 
173 to 175 
Action for  annulment  and  action  for  failure  to  act.  The 
action for annulment is  the means whereby the legality of 
measures adopted by the Council and by the Commission 
may be reviewed,  that is to say the means whereby all  or 
part of such measures may be annulled, whereas the action 
for failure  to act is the means whereby inaction on the part of the Council or the 
Commission may be impugned. 
The same conditions as to jurisdiction and admissibility apply to these two types of 
action,  of which it may be said that one represents an action against positive acts 
and the other an action against  negative  behaviour. 
EEC Treaty,  Art. 173  The  action for  annulment.  The action for  annulment has a 
three-fold objective : review of  the conformity with the estab-
lishing Treaties of measures adopted by the Community legislature, review of the le-
gality of individual decisions and regulations of the Commission and the settlement of 
certain disputes  between the institutions regarding  their respective  powers.  The 
grounds for annulment enumerated in the Treaty are as follows : lack of competence, 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, misuse of powers and infringe-
ment of the Treaty or of  any rule of law relating to its application. The Court has un-
11 derstood this series of rules in a wide sense and has even recognized that the Commu-
nity institutions may be bound by international agreements, such as GATT, which are 
binding upon all the Member States, and by international conventions, such as the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, which has been ratified 
by all the States of the Community. 
The action  for  annulment is  unconditionally  admissible  in the  case  of Member 
States  and the institutions.  On the  other  hand,  the  EEC  Treaty introduced  a 
restriction by comparison with the ECSC Treaty, inasmuch as this action is available 
only subject to strict limitations to individuals,  whether natural or legal persons, 
who may institute proceedings only against decisions addressed to them personally 
or against those which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed 
to another person, are of direct and individual concern to them.  It follows that the 
action for annulment may not be employed by natural or legal persons to contest 
regulations of a general nature. 
EEC Treaty,  Art. 174  If  the Court considers the action to be admissible and well 
founded,  it  annuls  the  act  concerned.  The  annulment 
takes effect erga  omnes and is  binding in all the Member States, which are obliged 
to abstain from applying the contested measure. 
However,  the Treaty itself attenuates the severity of such a  step by allowing the 
Court of Justice to state which of the effects of the regulation which it has annulled 
shall be considered as definitive. 
EEC Treaty,  Art. 175  The  action for failure  to  act.  The action for  failure  to act 
allows  negligent  or  voluntary  silence  or  inaction  on  the 
part of the Council or the Commission to be censured. 
The institution must however previously have been called upon to act and is given 
a period of two months in which to do so. 
The action for failure to act,  like the action for annulment, is  open mainly to the 
Member States  and to the institutions,  but,  subject to the same  restriction,  it is 
available to individuals, who must show that the decision which the institution has 
failed to adopt is of direct and individual concern to them. 
II- Actions in which the Court has unlimited jurisdiction 
ECSC Treaty,  Art. 36 
EAEC Treaty,  Articles 
83  & 144 
EEC Treaty,  Art. 172 
Actions against  coercive  measures  adopted  by  the  institutions 
of the Community.  Regulations  made by the Council may 
give  the Court of Justice  unlimited jurisdiction in regard 
to  the  penalties  provided  for  in  such  regulations.  This 
provision has taken on particular importance in the field of  competition. 1  The Court 
is empowered not only to annul administrative sanctions adopted by the Commission 
1  Regulation No 17 of the Council, Official Journal No 13,  February 1962,  p.  204. 
12 against undertakings for infringement of  the rules of  competition, but may also amend 
them, that is to say,  either reduce or increase the amount of the fines  or periodic 
penalty payments. 
ECSC Treaty,  Art. 40 
EAEC Treaty,  Articles 
151  and 188 
EEC  Treaty,  Articles 
178  and  215,  second 
paragraph 
Actions based  upon  non-contractual  liability.  In accordance 
with the general principles common to the laws of the Mem-
ber States,  the Community must  make  good  any damage 
caused  by its institutions or by its servants in the perfor-
mance of their duties.  The Court of Justice has unlimited 
jurisdiction in this field  both to assess  the basis of liability and to decide whether 
responsibility  for  the  damage  may  be  ascribed  to  Community  action,  as  well 
as to assess the amount of the damage and to quantify it. 
Staff  Regulations of 
Officials 
Actions brought  by  Community  Public  Servants.  The Court 
exercises a power of unlimited jurisdiction pursuant to the 
Staff Regulations. 
These cases  are generally heard by the Chambers.  In view of the ever growing 
number of cases, proposals are being made for the creation of a court of  first instance 
with the task of examining the facts of disputes. 
EEC Treaty,  Art. 181  Decisions  adopted  pursuant  to  an  arbitration  clause.  'The 
Court of Justice shall  have jurisdiction to give judgment 
pursuant to any arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded by or on behalf 
of the Community, whether that contract be governed by public or private law'. 
ill  - The procedure for preliminary rulings 
EEC Treaty,  Art. 177  Article 177 of the EEC Treaty states: 
'The Court of  Justice shall have jurisdiction to give prelimin-
ary rulings concerning : 
(a)  the interpretation of this Treaty; 
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community; 
(c)  the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, 
where those statutes so provide. 
'Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, 
that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary 
to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of  Justice to give a ruling thereon. 
'Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a 
Member State,  against whose decisions there is  no judicial remedy under national 
law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of  Justice'. 
This is undoubtedly the most important provision both as regards the assimilation 
of European law into the national legal  systems and as  regards the uniform inter-
pretation of that law in all countries of the Community. 
13 In order to understand the precise scope of this procedure it is  necessary to bear 
in mind the nature of the Treaties establishing the Communities.  They may be 
distinguished from standard international treaties in that the latter create rights and 
obligations  only in respect  of the states  themselves  and not for  their nationals, 
whereas numerous provisions of Community law, both primary and secondary, are 
directly and immediately applicable within the legal order of each Member State. 
That is  to  say that various  provisions  of the Treaty or of measures  adopted in 
implementation thereof create individual rights in favour of nationals of the Member 
States on which individuals may rely before their courts.  These rules are an integral 
part of the law in force within the national legal order and the courts of each of the 
Member States are themselves also Community courts to the extent to which they 
have  jurisdiction to  apply  Community  law.  It was  therefore  imperative  that a 
uniform interpretation of Community law should be guaranteed. 
The Treaty also  lays  down the detailed rules for  this collaboration between the 
national court and the Community Court: 
Where a question of Community law is raised before a court of first instance or of 
appeal, that court may refer the matter to the Co1Jrt of Justice by way of a request 
for a preliminary ruling,  and where any such question is raised before a supreme 
national court against whose decisions there is  no judicial remedy under national 
law, that supreme court is bound to refer the matter to the Court of  Justice.  Accord-
ingly, the latter may be seised of a case only by decision of a national court.  The 
question referred must fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, that is to 
say, it must be limited to the interpretation or application of Community law.  The 
Court of Justice is bound to reply to any question referred which falls  within the 
limits of its jurisdiction, but it refrains from offering any solution to the dispute in 
the main action.  Likewise,  it has no jurisdiction to interpret national laws nor-
within the context of the procedure for  preliminary rulings-is it empowered to 
assess  their uniformity with Community law.  Only the national court may,  if it 
considers it necessary, withdraw a question which it has referred to the Court.  In 
short, in so far as the national court is concerned, this device constitutes a procedural 
step. 
During more than twenty years of the Court's existence this procedure has become 
ever more important.  After an uncertain start, between 1961 and 1966, less than ten 
judgments were given per year;  between 1966 and 1969,  between ten and fifteen 
judgments  per  year;  between  1970  and  1974  the  flood-gates  were  opened  and 
judgments  given  per  year  on  preliminary  references  have  numbered  between 
thirty and fifty. 
Up to 1975 applications for preliminary rulings were assigned only to the Full Court. 
In view of the growth in the number of such cases,  the new Rules of Procedure 
approved by the Council of the European Communities on 26 November 197  4 allow 
them to be referred to the Chambers, on condition that they are cases which are of 
an essentially technical  nature or concern  matters  for  which there is  already  an 
established body of case-law.  The decision to assign is  taken by the Full Court 
14 following presentation by the Judge-Rapporteur of his preparatory report and after 
the Advocate-General has been heard.  A case may not be so assigned if a Member 
State has exercised its right to submit a statement of case or written observations, 
or if an institution expressly requests in its observations that the case be decided in 
plenary session. 
The case-law of the Court, like that of national courts, has laid down the circum-
stances in which interpretation may be requested. 
By way of example, the following are various cases for the purpose of which prelim-
inary questions may be referred to the Court of Justice : 
- to specify the meaning and scope of provisions of the Treaties or of measures 
of secondary law; 
- to determine whether a provision of Community law refers to the legislation of 
one Member State or to that of another; 
- to specify the effects of a Community rule as regards time; 
- to decide which legal measures or acts are governed by Community law and which 
by national law; 
- to determine whether Community rules may or must be clarified or supplemented 
by national legislation; 
- to decide whether a provision of Community law has direct effect. 
The second sphere of application of Article  177  of the EEC Treaty concerns the 
assessment of the validity of measures adopted by the institutions.  The concept 
of validity relates not only to formal  or external conformity,  but also  to inherent 
legality.  It must be appreciated not only with reference to the text of the Treaty 
and to general legal principles but also possibly by reference to international law. 
15 Procedure 
Protocol  on  the  Statute 
of the  Court  of justice 
Rules of Procedure 
The procedure  before  the  Court of Justice  is  mixed :  it 
comprises two stages,  written and oral. 
A  distinction  should  be made  between the  procedure  in 
direct actions and that in references for preliminary rulings. 
In the case  of a  direct action,  the written stage of the adversary proceedings is 
initiated by an application, sent by a lawyer to the Registry of  the Court by registered 
letter.  The application must contain : 
- the name and permanent residence of the applicant; 
- the name of the party against whom the application is made; 
- the subject-matter of the dispute and the grounds on which the application is 
based; 
- the form of order sought by the applicant; 
- the nature of any evidence which he intends to adduce; 
- the address for service  chosen by the applicant in the place where the Court 
has its seat,  giving the name of a person who is authorized and has expressed 
willigness to accept service. 
The application is served by the Registry of the Court of Justice on the defendant, 
who lodges a  defence.  This is  followed  by the applicant's reply and finally  by a 
rejoinder on the part of the defendant. 
These documents must be lodged according to a  strict time-limit which only the 
President of the Court may modify. 
The written stage is followed by the oral stage of the procedure. 
The President assigns each case to a Chamber and designates the Judge-Rapporteur 
who presents a  preparatory report,  either written or oral,  briefly setting out the 
facts and subject-matter of the dispute.  It is also at this stage of the procedure that 
a decision is  reached on the question whether or not the case requires measures of 
16 inquiry, such as experts' reports, an inspection of  the place or thing in question or the 
taking of oral testimony.  When the date of the hearing of the oral procedure has 
been fixed  the Judge-Rapporteur commits  to a  report  for  the hearing the facts 
alleged and the arguments adduced by the parties and by the interveners, if any. 
The case is then heard in public.  After the hearing the Advocate-General delivers 
his opinion which not only contains a detailed study of the issues of fact and, above 
all, of law involved but also contains a proposal to the Court for the solution of the 
dispute. 
The oral procedure is then closed and the Court deliberates upon the case-.  Judg-
ment is given at a later public hearing.  It is served on the parties and is thereafter 
enforceable in all the Member States. 
A  reference  for  a  preliminary  ruling  displays  certain  differences.  The national 
court submits questions to the Court of Justice on the validity or interpretation of a 
Community provision by way of a ruling of that court (decision, judgment or order), 
containing the text of the question or questions which it wishes to refer to the Court 
of Justice.  This decision is transmitted by the registry of the national court to the 
Registry  of the Court of Justice and is  accompanied,  where necessary,  by a  file 
serving to acquaint the Court of Justice with the context and scope of the questions 
referred.  After a period of two months, within which the Commission, the Member 
States  and the parties to the national  proceedings may submit observations  or a 
statement of case to the Court of  Justice, they are invited to attend a hearing during 
which they are given the opportunity of submitting oral observations. 
Following the delivery of the Advocate-General's opinion the judgment given by 
the Court of Justice is  notified  to the national  court by the intermediary of the 
registries. 
Who is entitled to plead before the Court of Justice? 
The Member States and the institutions of the Community are represented before 
the Court by Agents,  generally members of their legal departments, who are also 
entitled to the assistance of an adviser or lawyer. 
In respect of individuals, lawyers entitled to practise before a court of a Member 
State may appear before the Court of  Justice.  However, where the law of a Member 
State  recognizes  their right to do so  university teachers  of law  may also  appear 
before the Court.  This is the case with university teachers in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
What are the rules regarding language? 
The  procedural  languages  are  the  official  languages  of the  Community;  Court 
publications are  published in those languages.  The choice  of the language  of a 
case lies with the applicant, subject to certain provisions : 
- if the defendant is a Member State or a natural or legal person having the nation-
ality of a Member State, the language of the case is the official language of that 
17 State; where the State has more than one official  language, the applicant may 
choose between them; 
- at the request of  one of  the parties, and after the opposite party and the Advocate-
General have been heard, the Court may authorize another official language of 
the Community to be used for all or part of the proceedings.  This option is not 
granted to  institutions of the European Communities. 
In the case of preliminary rulings, the language of the case is that of the national 
court or tribunal which is referring the matter to the Court.  Texts of documents 
drawn up in the language of the case are authentic. 
Who pays the costs of proceedings before the Court? 
Proceedings before the Court are free of charge.  The Court gives a decision as to 
costs in its final judgment or in the order which closes the proceedings. 
18 Main themes 
of  Community case-law 
The Court of Justice of the European Communities is the Court of,  inter alia,  an 
economic  community.  It follows  that the  Court's sphere  of activity  principally 
covers the field of  economic law.  However, the Court is called upon to give judgment 
in a variety of cases lying outside the field of economic interests properly so-called. 
(The social sphere,  human rights and fundamental guarantees of the Community 
Treaties, balance of powers between the institutions, and so on). 
What are the substantive rules of law which it is the Court's task to apply? 
- Mention must first be made of topics with the implementation of the customs 
union:  external  Community  trade,  linked  to  the  establishment  of common 
rules  governing  economic  relations  with third States,  and internal  trade  and 
its corollary, the free movement of goods within the Community. 
- We must next consider the more specialized fields  for  which the Treaty has 
laid down common rules,  such as the Common Agricultural Policy,  which has 
given rise  to numerous cases  involving  the law on agriculture;  the rules con-
cerning  transport,  freedom  of establishment  and  the  provision  of services, 
and the particularly important field  covered by the rules of competition, that is 
to  say  the  rules  relating  to  restrictive agreements,  to  the  abuse of dominant 
positions and to illegal interference by the States in the free play of competition. 
- A  final  aspect-and not the least important-is the case-law of the Court on 
social  problems.  It  is  essentially  concerned  with  two  themes :  freedom  of 
movement for workers and social security for migrant workers. 
I - Freedom of trade and a single market 
The essential object of the Community, according to Article 2 of the EEC Treaty, 
is the establishment of a common market.  Article 9 of the Treaty lays down that 
this common market shall be based upon a 'customs union' involving the abolition 
19 of all obstacles to the free movement of goods, by the elimination of customs duties 
and of all  charges  having equivalent effect as  well  as  all  quantitative restrictions 
and measures having equivalent effect.  From the very beginning the Community 
has  had to fight  against  entrenched protectionism and the repercussions  of this 
conflict are apparent in the case-law of the Court. 
This judicial activity has led, in three successive waves, to a body of case-law in the 
following three fields : more or less open protectionist measures, overt interference 
with freedom of trade, and finally tax discrimination and disguised protectionism. 
Overt interference with the free  movement of  goods 
In the earliest days  of the Community, the Member States  appeared to want to 
neutralize  the  adverse  effects  of foreign  competition  on  given  economic  sectors 
by the reflex action of the creation of taxes and restrictions, and even of prohibitions 
on import.  These cases  were to give  rise  to actions  against  Member States  for 
failure to fulfil an obligation, and each of them resulted in the Member State con-
cerned being found guilty of that failure.  The following judgments may be cited 
in chronological order : 
- Commission  v  Italian  Republic,  a  case  concerning  imports  of  pigmeat  -
19 December 1961  (Rec. p. 633) 
- Commission v  Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and  Kingdom of Belgium,  the 
ginger-bread case- 14 December 1962 ([1962] ECR 425) 
- Commission  v  Grand  Duchy  of Luxembourg  and  Kingdom  of Belgium,  a 
case concerning milk products- 13 November 1964 ([1964]  ECR 625) 
- Commission v Italian Republic, a case concerning lead and zinc- 18 February 
1970 (Rec. p. 47). 
In all  these  cases,  the case-law  clearly indicates that the objectives  stated in the 
Treaties establishing the Communities should be observed.  The Court of Justice 
will not countenance in any way any practice on the part of a Member State, whether 
overt or covert, which may be at variance with the obligations it has undertaken to 
fulfil. 
The principle of  non-discrimination 
This principle,  which is the inspiration behind numerous provisions of the EEC 
Treaty, is applied to important effect in the sphere of  taxation.  The Treaty provides 
that internal taxes  must be applied  without discrimination to foreign  and home 
products alike,  so as to avoid the use of internal charges for protectionist purposes. 
When customs  duties  and  quantitative  restrictions  were  finally  eliminated  from 
intra-Community trade, it became apparent that there were 'tax barriers' resulting 
from disparities between national taxation laws and, more particular1y, tax provisions 
whose effect was to put imported products at a disadvantage by comparison with 
domestic production.  Mention should be made of the judgment of 16 June 1966 in 
Li.itticke ([1966] ECR 19), and of the judgments of 3 and 4 April1968 in Molkerei-
zentrale ([1968]  ECR 143), in which the Court firmly upheld the principle of non-
20 discrimination in matters of taxation.  Numerous actions have been brought against 
Member States for failure to fulfil an obligation in the matter of domestic taxation 
systems which are limited to sectors or even particular products, such as the discrim-
inatory charge on imported spirits (Commission v Italian Republic, 15 October 1969, 
Rec. p. 377); discriminatory tax refunds in favour of the engineering industry (Com-
mission  v  Italian  Republic,  19  November  1969,  Rec.  p.  433);  the discriminatory 
excise duty imposed on imports of cocoa (Commission v Italian Republic,  15 April 
1970,  Rec.  p.  187);  the taxation of imports of wood  (Commission v  Kingdom of 
Belgium, 5 May 1970, Rec. p. 237). 
Measures  having effects equivalent to  customs duties  and quantitative restrictions 
In order to ensure that these  prohibitions were  not circumvented by indirect or 
disguised action on the part of national authorities, the authors of the Treaty were 
at pains to append to each such rule a prohibition on 'measures having equivalent 
effect', that is to say,  fiscal  or commercial measures which, although not ostensibly 
in the nature of customs duties or quantitative restrictions, nevertheless had the same 
restrictive effect on trade. 
In the field of charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties, the Court has 
had occasion to classify as such : a statistical levy on exported goods (Commission v 
Italian Republic,  1 July 1969,  Rec.  p.  193);  a charge of 0.5 % for  administrative 
services  on  importation  (Commission  v  Italian  Republic,  18  November  1970, 
Rec. p. 961; S.A.C.E. judgment of 17 December 1970, Rec. p.  1213, and the Politi 
judgment of 14  December  1971,  Rec.  p.  1039);  a  charge for  sanitary inspection 
(Marimex,  judgment of 14  December  1972,  Rec.  p.  1309);  an unloading charge 
(Variola, judgment of 10 October 1973,  [1973]  ECR 981);  an ad valorem charge of 
one-third per cent on imports of unworked diamonds (Diamanarbeiders, judgment 
of 1 July 1969, Rec. p. 211).  This last judgment displays the extreme rigour of the 
Court's position on this matter.  In fact the charge was minimal and was levied on a 
specific commodity, the revenue from the charge being devoted to a Social Fund 
for  Diamond Workers  which  was  intended  to  give  the latter  certain  additional 
social advantages. 
Measures having effects equivalent to quantitative restrictions came to the attention 
of the Court at a somewhat later date.  Mention should be made of the Dassonville 
judgment of 11  July  1974  ([1974]  ECR 837)  concerning the free  movement  of 
Scotch whisky.  In this case the Court classified as measures having an effect equiv-
alent to quantitative restrictions administrative formalities designed to exclude any 
importation of a  product otherwise than directly from  the country of origin.  A 
further  significant  judgment has  been  given  in  an  action  against  Germany  for 
failure to fulfil an obligation and concerns the designations 'Sekt' and 'Weinbrand' 
(Commission v Federal Republic of Germany, 20 February 1975).  The conclusion 
to be drawn from this judgment is that a Member State cannot introduce legislation 
to promote artificially a generic designation to the status of an appellation of origin 
so as to secure an advantage for the national product. 
21 II - Competition 
It is  surely unnecessary to emphasize the importance of the rules concerning com-
petition law  in a  body of law  which,  by its  nature and objectives,  is  principally 
econom1c. 
In the national context 'restrictive agreements' and 'monopolies' represent familiar 
aspects of competition law.  Community law has added a new dimension based on 
the prohibition of restrictive agreements and the exploitation of dominant positions, 
these  concepts being  governed by Articles  85  and 86 of the EEC Treaty.  The 
Treaty also condemns State intervention between national economies in the context 
of the Common Market as a whole. 
For Community law to take effect it is necessary, at least at first, that practices which 
are  inimical to competition should affect  trade between Member States.  In the 
course of the many cases brought before it the Court of Justice has had occasion to 
define  the field  of application  of Community competition law.  A  few  examples 
chosen from recent case-law may illustrate this edifice of competition law : 
- The 'territorial' aspect of the application of competition rules was  defined by 
the Court in nine judgments dated  14 July  1972,  in the so-called Dye-stuffs 
Cases  (Rec.  p.  619).  Nine  manufacturers  of dye-stuffs  had brought actions 
against  a  Commission  decision  fining  them  for  contravening  Article  85(1) 
of the EEC Treaty, in that they took concerted action in raising prices in 1964, 
1965  and 1967.  Three of the applicant undertakings, the registered offices  of 
which were situated outside the Community, had claimed that the Commission 
could not impose fines in respect of acts which they had committed outside the 
Community.  The Court, having established that the applicants had determined 
compulsory prices and other conditions of sale for their subsidiaries within the 
Community,  confirmed the penalties imposed by the Commission,  even with 
respect to undertakings not situated within the Community territory. 
- The Cementhandelaren case of 10  October 1972 (Rec.  p.  988) was  concerned 
with a purely national agreement, limited to Netherlands territory.  The relevant 
association  of cement  manufacturers attempted to argue  from this that trade 
between Member States could not be affected.  The Court held that an agreement 
covering the whole of the territory of a Member State has, by its very nature, the 
effect of consolidating partitions erected on a national basis, and thereby inhibits 
the economic interpenetration intended by the Treaty and ensures protection 
for national production. 
- In the Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents judgment of 
6 March 1974 ([1974] ECR 223), the Court of Justice stated, inter alia, that the 
prohibition on abuse of a dominant position, in so  far as it might affect trade 
between  Member States,  was intended  to define  the sphere of application of 
Community rules in relation to national laws.  It could not therefore be inter-
preted as limiting the field of application of the prohibition which it contained 
to industrial and commercial activities supplying the Member States.  It was suffi-
cient that the free movement of  goods between the Community and third countries 
22 should  be inhibited.  The two companies  had  requested  the annulment of a 
Commission decision imposing on them fines and periodic penalty payments for 
refusing to supply a  competing company with pharmaceutical products.  The 
companies claimed in their reply that their refusal to sell the product (an anti-
tubercular medicament) was  not an obstacle to trade between Member States 
of  the EEC, since it was intended for export to developing countries. 
- The Court has had occasion to define what must be understood by the 'pattern 
of competition'  within the Community.  It did so in an important judgment of 
21  February  1973,  Europemballage  and  Continental  Can ([1973]  ECR 215). 
This case  raised a fundamental problem : the relationship between Article 85, 
concerning restrictive agreements, and Article 86, concerning dominant positions, 
the question actually raised being whether these two provisions form a unified 
system.  The Court placed Article 86  in the context of that system,  showing 
that in conformity with the general objective of the competition policy stated 
in Article  3,  the Treaty contains  a  coherent system  of rules  of competition, 
so that no legal vacuum can be deemed to exist between Articles 85  and 86. 
- The Court of Justice also  further defined  competition law in the field  of the 
Commission's powers in the procedure provided by Article 85(3) for exemption 
from Article 85(1) of the Treaty.  The Court ruled in its judgment in the Trans-
ocean Marine Paints Association case of 23  October 1974 ([1974]  ECR 1063) 
that the Commission must be in a position at any moment to check whether the 
conditions justifying the exemption are still present. 
- Apart from  specific  aspects  of competition  law  the Court of Justice has  had 
occasion  to  consider the effect  of the Common Market on the protection of 
industrial and commercial property rights.  In fact  any right to industrial or 
commercial protection confers on the holder of  that right a position of  exclusivity, 
which,  although legitimate in itself,  may also  form  the subject matter of re-
strictive agreements or give rise to monopolistic exploitation. 
The case  of Belgische Radio en Televisie v  Sabam and F onior (Judgment of 
21  March  1974,  [1974]  ECR 313)  raised the question whether an abuse of a 
dominant position is  committed by an undertaking which exercises a  de  facto 
monopoly in a Member State for the management of copyrights and which re-
quires of its members the global assignment, for a period of five years following 
the withdrawal of a member, of all  copyrights, without drawing any distinction 
between specific categories of such rights.  The Court ruled that such practices 
may constitute an abuse. 
In the G. Sacchi (Cable Television) judgment of 30 April1974 ([1974] ECR 409), 
the Court had occasion to specify that the grant of the exclusive right to transmit 
television signals does not as such constitute a breach of the Treaty.  However, 
discrimination by undertakings enjoying such exclusive rights against nationals of 
Member States by reason of  their nationality is incompatible with Community law. 
- Finally,  two  cases  in which the Court of Justice gave  rulings  concerning the 
limitations on the use of a patent or trade-mark. 
23 In the so-called Cafe Hag case,  Van Zuylen, judgment of 3 July 1974 ([1974] 
ECR 731), the Court ruled that the national character of laws relating to trade-
mark protection cannot be used to partition the Common Market-the trade-
marks in question having of  course the same origin.  In this case the matter at issue 
was the trade-mark 'Cafe Hag', registered at Bremen and sold to a Belgian trader. 
In the Centrafarm, Winthrop and Sterling Drug judgments of 31  October 1974 
([1974]  ECR 1147),  the Court of Justice held that the sole purpose of patents 
is to prevent fraud and that they must not be used or abused for purposes of 
commercial  policy.  The existence  of a  patent must neither  impede the free 
movement of goods within the European Community nor serve to create new 
restrictions on trade. 
III- The Community as a 'social union' 
The expressions 'Economic Community' and 'Common Market' merely convey the 
Europe of trade and industry, the Europe of business. 
However, right from the beginning, the Community has had a social aspect. 
The EEC Treaty contains a number of provisions intended to allow nationals of all 
Member States-including both employed workers and self-employed persons-to 
exercise the most diverse economic activities in conditions of freedom and equality. 
The two basic principles of the system are those of freedom of movement of persons 
and equality of treatment for nationals of all the Member States.  Numerous sub-
stantive provisions derive from these principles; freedom of movement for employed 
persons;  freedom of economic establishment and the provision of services; equality 
between nationals of all  the  Member States as  regards the right of access to and 
exercise of professional or trade activities of all  kinds; equal rights in the field  of 
social security. 
The field of application of the rules of social policy 
Article 48  of the EEC Treaty prohibits all  discrimination based upon nationality 
'between workers of the Member States as  regards employment, remuneration and 
other conditions of work and employment'.  Article 51  entrusts to the Council the 
task of establishing in the field of social security 'such measures ... as are necessary 
to provide freedom of movement for workers'. 
What is the personal and material field  of application of these provisions? 
Who is the 'worker' protected by the Community's social law? 
At first sight, in order to benefit from the social protection provided by the Treaty 
and Community regulations, three characteristics must be present : to be a worker, 
employed and migrant.  In practice, over the years,  Community case-law has had 
to define these terms and elaborate, in the light of the text of the regulations, both 
the social security techniques implemented by them and socially satisfactory solutions 
for a whole range of individuals worthy of special attention who do not possess the 
three requisite characteristics : unemployed migrant workers, employed workers who 
are not exactly migrant, and so on. 
24 A number of  judgments illustrate this case-law : 
The Hoekstra (nee Unger) judgment of 19 March 1964 ([1964) ECR 177) states that 
Community rules are not intended to restrict protection only to the worker in em-
ployment but tend to protect also the worker who, having left his job, is capable of 
taking another. 
The judgments in Singer,  of 9 December 1965  ([1965]  ECR 965),  and Caisse de 
Maladie des Chemins de Fer Luxembourgeois, of 12 November 1969 (Rec. p. 405), 
confirm that the worker who suffers an accident while on holiday or on a pleasure 
trip enjoys the protection of Community rules.  The U gliola judgment, of 15 October 
1969 (Rec. p. 363), accords the same rights to a migrant worker for the period during 
which he is engaged in national service in his country of origin. 
The social policy rules of the Common Market in relation to employed workers also 
protect the 'family helper', engaged in agricultural work (cf. judgment in Jansen of 
27 October 1971, Rec. p. 859). 
The De Cicco judgment, of 19 December 1968 ([1968]  ECR 473),  treats craftsmen 
in the same way as employed workers to the extent to which, pursuant to the pro-
visions of  a national law, they are protected against one or more risks by the extension 
to them of schemes organized for the benefit of workers in general. 
Thus the case-law  of the Court is  moving  away  from  the strict  concept of the 
'migrant-employed-worker'  towards  a  wider  concept  of  the  socially  protected 
'Community citizen'. 
What advantages are covered by the concept of 'social security'?  How is the prin-
ciple of equality of treatment to be applied in view of the variety of social security 
schemes? 
At the national level new systems of social security are developing, based far more 
upon the idea of social interdependence than upon participation in the work process. 
As far as finance is concerned, there is a move away from the system of  contributions 
towards a varying degree of taxation of resources. 
Naturally enough, the case-law of the Court reflects this evolution.  The problem 
was raised for the first time in the Torrekensjudgment, of7 May 1969 (Rec. p.  125), 
concerning a  non-contributory social  security scheme,  in fact  the payment of an 
allowance to aged wage-earners. 
The Frilli judgment, of 22 June 1972 (Rec. p. 457),  concerns the application to an 
Italian  national  resident in Belgium  of the Belgian  law  instituting a  guaranteed 
income for old people. 
The judgments in Heinze, of 16 November 1972  (Rec. p. 1105), and MichelS., of 
11  April1973 ([1973) ECR 457) confirm the equality of nationals of all the Member 
States in the field of medical welfare and allowances for handicapped persons. 
The judgments in Casagrande, of 3 July 1974 ([1974]  ECR 773),  and Alaimo,  of 
29 January 1975, confirm equality of treatment for nationals of the Member States 
in the field of scholastic allowances. 
25 Free movement of persons and public policy 
Up to the present time the application of the provisions relating to free movement 
of persons does not appear to have raised any major problem within the Community. 
However, the Court of Justice has been called upon to examine the problem of the 
line of demarcation to be drawn between the principle of free  movement and the 
exception relating to public policy and public security contained in Articles 48 and 
56  of the EEC Treaty.  This question has  been interpreted in the judgments in 
VanDuyn, of 4 December 1974, and Bonsignore, of 26 February 1975. 
Professional or trade activities and the principle of  equality of treatment 
As regards professional or trade activities, the EEC Treaty embodies the principle 
of equality of treatment.  This rule is specified in Article 48 in relation to employed 
persons, in Article 52 in relation to the right of establishment and in Article 60 in 
relation to the provision of services. 
In all areas of professional or trade activities the Member States must refrain from 
making any distinction between their own nationals and nationals of the other Mem-
ber States.  Of course,  they retain their sovereign power to lay down by law the 
conditions for entry to the various occupations and the rules governing their exercise. 
However, and this is where Community law intervenes, it is no longer permissible to 
discriminate, in the application of  those provisions, between nationals of  one Member 
State and those of the others. 
Two  particularly  interesting  cases  illustrate  these  principles :  the  judgment  in 
Reyners v  Belgian State,  of 21  June  1974 ([1974]  ECR 631),  in which the Court 
declared that the rule as to non-discrimination applies to the particular situation of 
the profession of advocate,  and the judgment in Van Binsbergen,  of 3 December 
197 4,  stating that the same applies in the case of an authorized agent.  These two 
cases differ in the sense that, in Reyners, it was the nationality of the plaintiff in the 
main action which constituted the obstacle, whereas in Van Binsbergen the question 
turned on a matter of residence. 
26 Conclusion 
'Such therefore, with all its powers and procedures, is  the Court of Justice of the 
Communities to which has  been entrusted the safeguarding of the law.  It is  the 
judge of legality within the Community and has direct jurisdiction over the insti-
tutions, the Member States and individuals.  However, as official interpreter of that 
law,  it maintains an uninterrupted dialogue with the courts and tribunals of the 
Member States for the purpose of ensuring the uniform application of the legislation 
throughout the Community, irrespective of state frontiers.  This dual role gives it 
the character of an original but authentic court,  more akin to a domestic than an 
international court'. 
'... Heterogeneous,  subtle,  pragmatic,  evolving-these are the characteristics of a 
law  expressly  created to ensure the  foundation  and,  further,  the expansion of a 
society of a  new  type,  of a  law  at every manifestation of which  more and more 
numerous elements of a multi-national, multi-state community take root in a society 
based on separate nations and states and, at the same time, promote the need for an 
extension of the Community concept. 
This law has been observed striving, through the management of a common market, 
towards  a  nascent  community.  Rooted  as  it is  in international law-under the 
auspices of the Treaties-it has little by little taken on elements gathered from all 
sources of law : from international law to domestic law,  from public law to private 
law and even economic law,  which it is progressively absorbing into its being until 
the day when,  we  believe,  finally  structured within  a  multi-national framework, 
it will be seen to be a truly internal legal order'. 
These few  words  in conclusion  are  taken  from  an address in which Mr Robert 
Lecourt, President of the Court of  Justice of the European Communities since 1967, 
expressed his thoughts on the role of the judge vis-a-vis the Common Market. 1 
1  Taken from 'Etudes et travaux de l'Institut universitaire de hautes etudes internationales' No 10. 
Geneva 1970. 
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